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Dynamic Capital Structure and Political Patronage: 
The Case of Malaysia 
 
 
Abstract: This paper investigates the effect of political patronage on firms’ capital structure. 
The evidence is from Malaysia a country characterised by relationship-capitalism and covers 
1988 to 2009. Using a system GMM estimator we find firms set leverage targets and adjust 
towards them following deviations at the rate of 28 per cent per annum. Next, we construct a 
natural experiment and use a difference-in-differences model to investigate if the strategic 
financing decisions of politically patronised firms differs from non-connected firms after an 
exogenous shock caused by the 1997 Asian crisis. Our results unambiguously demonstrate a 
significant difference in the capital structure of patronised firms relative to non-connected 
firms following the exogenous shock but only for the crisis period 1998-2001. After 2002 the 
capital structures of patronised and non-connected firms are statistically equivalent.  
 
JEL Classification: G01 (Financial Crises), G32 (Financing Policy; Financial Risk and 
Risk Management; Capital and Ownership Structure). 
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I.  Introduction 
Prior research demonstrates that many firms set capital structure targets.
1
 Targeting implies 
firms’ make strategic choices on leverage and respond to temporary deviations by rebalancing 
the mix of debt and equity financing (see Jalilivand and Harris, 1984; Graham and Harvey, 2001; 
Hovakimian et al, 2001; Leary and Roberts, 2005; Flannery and Rangan, 2006; Kayhan and 
Titman; 2007; DeAngelo et al, 2011). These decisions affect firms’ investment choices, capital 
costs and expected returns, and could trigger conflicts of interest between firms’ stakeholders. 
Whilst targeting requires firms’ to balance the merits of over- and under-leverage relative to 
adjustment costs, full adjustment is unattainable because of market frictions, which infers firms’ 
face perpetual financing choices since sub-optimal financing decisions could realise lower firm 
value or increase the probability of bankruptcy. 
The objective of this paper is to evaluate firms’ capital structure choices under political 
patronage. Whereas the value of political connections to firms is well documented (see Fisman, 
2001; Faccio, 2006, 2010; Khwaja and Mian, 2005; Leuz and Oberholzer-Gee, 2006; Wu et al, 
2012), the impact of patronage on firms’ strategic decision-making is not. Our evidence comes 
from Malaysia which is representative of economies characterised by relationship-capitalism.
2
 
We define political patronage to include informal connections between politicians and firms 
according to personal histories (see also Johnson and Mitton, 2003; Faccio, 2005; Faccio, 
Masulis and McConnell, 2005; Johnson, Kochhar, Mitton and Tamirisa, 2006; Mitchell and 
Joseph, 2010). The source of this information is Gomez and Jomo (1997). A second more formal 
                                                          
1  Graham and Harvey (2001) report that 81 per cent of firms use a target debt ratio or range in financing 
decisions.  
2  Transparency International’s Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) measures public sector transparency and 
accountability. The 2012 CPI score for Malaysia is 49 (maximum of 100) ranking Malaysia as 54 of 176 
countries. Since its inception in 1995, the annual CPI for Malaysia shows public sector corruption neither 
improves nor worsens, and remains an anomaly. 
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type of patronage arises when Malaysia’s sovereign wealth fund (Khazanah Nasional Berhad, 
KNB) and government sponsored entities (like Permodalan Nasional Berhad, PNB) acquire 
equity holdings in firms. Fraser et al (2006) claim investments by KNB reflect political 
patronage associated with government’s industrialisation policies, whilst patronage through PNB 
complies with development policies to increase native Malays’ equity holdings (see Section IIC). 
We identify investments by the KNB and PNB from their websites. Historically, Malaysia’s 
governments influenced corporate activities through listing restrictions, direct equity stakes, 
control of banks, and government-sponsored investor vehicles (Gomez and Jomo, 1997). 
Consequently, politically connected firms carry more debt (Johnson and Mitton, 2003; Fraser et 
al, 2006; Bliss and Gul, 2012).  
The paper has two main aims. First, to determine the optimal capital structure of Malaysian 
firms on the basis of a set of “core factors”; namely, size, profitability, tangibility, investment 
opportunities, an industry benchmark for target leverage, and business risk (see Frank and Goyal, 
2009, p. 9).
3,4
 We analyse relationships to establish if the determinants of capital structure are 
explained by either the trade-off or pecking order theories, or by an amalgamation as indicated 
by dynamic trade-off theory. Using the partial adjustment technique, used commonly to 
empirically validate the trade-off theory, we estimate the speed of adjustment for Malaysian 
firms to provide evidence from an emerging market under relationship-capitalism.  
A second aim is to precisely gauge the effect of political patronage on firms’ financing 
decisions. Invoking a natural experiment setting, we classify firms as politically connected 
(patronised) or non-connected and contend the 1997 Asian crisis constitutes an exogenous shock 
                                                          
3  Shleifer and Vishny (1992) posit that liquidation values of assets in place also impacts on the level of debt 
(Benmelech et al, 2005, and Brown et al, 2006 offer empirical evidence).  
4  Lemmon et al (2008) find these factors explain as much as 80 per cent of variation in leverage ratios. 
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to Malaysian firms. A difference-in-differences framework empirically validates the following 
propositions: firms’ respond to an exogenous shock by revising capital structure decisions; 
second, patronage enables politically connected firms to behave differently to non-connected 
firms. We examine if firms’ financing decisions differ between an in-crisis period and 
subsequent recovery period, and whether patronage confers any effects in each period. To 
evaluate these propositions, the preferred econometric specification for the model specifies two 
post-shock periods and realises separate effects for patronised firms. The model is augmented 
with the core factors to identify predictive power and the impact of patronage, and also to reveal 
cross-time changes in financing strategies.  
It is intuitive that firms’ net operating incomes and equity prices would fall during an 
economic downturn and realise a jump in leverage causing anxiety to investors because of a 
perception that a firm is on the brink of bankruptcy. Consequently, firms either: (i) raise equity 
capital to reduce financial risk; or (ii) reduce debt. Raising capital in form of equity is not 
feasible due to the uncertainty over the duration of a crisis. Firms are compelled to cut debt by 
forgoing growth options or sell assets at fire sale prices thereby delaying economic recovery. 
However, patronised firms hold a critical advantage in the form of an implicit government 
guarantee they will be financially supported and not be allowed to fail. During periods of 
uncertainty, a close relationship between borrowing firms and lenders becomes a more important 
determinant of leverage than market-based explanations (Deesomsak et al, 2004). Thus, 
patronised firms find borrowing easier. Nevertheless, implicit government support could fade 
under the intensity of a crisis if the crisis raises systemic risk and causes disquiet in the ruling 
political party (as in Malaysia under the United Malays National Organization – UMNO) and 
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jeopardises the government’s future (see Johnson and Mitton, 2003; Prasso et al., 2009; and 
Mitchell and Joseph, 2010). 
We source financial statements data on 751 Malaysian firms from 1988 to 2009, yielding 
7,042 firm-year observations. Each firm is classified as either politically patronised or non-
connected. We use the system GMM estimator (Arellano and Bover, 1995; Blundell and Bond, 
1998) to estimate the dynamic capital structure of Malaysian firms, and regression analysis to 
estimate the difference-in-differences model. Various checks assess the robustness of the results.  
In preview, the results show Malaysian firms do target leverage and adjust towards the 
optimal level at an estimated speed of 28 per cent per annum, which is comparable with speeds 
reported for other countries. The analysis of the determinants of capital structure support a 
theoretical study (Ebrahim and Mathur, 2013) and show the trade-off theory and pecking order 
theory are complementary. The determinants are mostly stable across time though the economic 
importance of some factors changes. A second set of results shows Malaysian firms amend 
capital structure during the crisis with patronised firms reducing debt quicker than non-connected 
firms. It suggests politically connected firms suffer more when an exogenous shock limits 
government’s ability to patronise (Johnson and Mitton, 2003). The observed differences for 
patronised firms dissipate in the recovery period.  
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 surveys literature and offers 
further motivation. It contains sub-sections on capital structure; the role of political patronage; 
and political patronage in Malaysia. Section 3 shows the methodological framework. Section 4 
presents the core factors and theoretical expectations. Section 5 discusses data. Section 6 
presents the results from the dynamic capital structure and difference-in-differences models. 
Lastly, section 7 concludes.  
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II. Literature and motivation 
II.a Capital structure  
The capital structure debate originates with the irrelevance theorem of Modigliani and 
Miller (1958) proving independence of capital structure and firm value. The result is conditional 
upon assumptions bearing scant resemblance to the real-world: perfect capital markets; an 
absence of taxes, bankruptcy risk and liquidation costs. 
Subsequent developments incorporate market frictions such as corporate taxes (Modigliani 
and Miller, 1963) yielding an optimal capital structure of 100% debt maximizing firm value.  
This model too omits several relevant factors. Miller (1977) extends the above model by 
introducing personal income tax. The solution derives when the marginal benefit from increasing 
leverage (shielding profit from tax) is equal to the marginal cost of enticing equity holders into 
debt (attractive interest rates offsetting the favourable tax treatment individuals receive on 
equity). This solution yields a constant average capital costs resembling Millers’ earlier work 
with Modigliani. 
One factor missing is bankruptcy risk. This suggests a trade-off approach (see Myers, 
1984).  That is, an optimal capital structure occurs at level of leverage where the marginal cost 
(higher probability of financial distress) and marginal benefit (tax shield advantage) of increasing 
debt equate. Agency costs are yet another factor. In selecting a capital structure, firms should 
consider agency costs stemming from conflicts of interest between their different stakeholders 
(Jensen, 1986; Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Myers, 1977). At highly levered firms, equity holders 
benefit from upside risk. Debt holders could protect their interests through monitoring firm 
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managers (and enhanced disclosure requirements), but this action raises costs.
5
 Apart from stock 
holder-debt holder conflicts, the literature highlights one further agency issue, which is the 
agency issue arising between various classes of equity owners of patronised firms (see Sections 
IIb and IIc). 
While trade-off theory provides useful insights on capital structure, it does not explain the 
negative stock price reactions to corporate financing events which are more severe for equity 
offerings than debt (Denis, 2012). Myers and Majluf (1984) contend that firm managers know 
outside investors discount firms’ stock prices, leading firms to either avoid issuing equity or 
issue when mangers perceive equity is overvalued. On this basis, Myers (1984) proposes the 
pecking-order theory which posits that firms exhibit a preferred hierarchy in financing decisions. 
Firms minimize adverse selection problems by issuing the least information-sensitive securities 
(debt) first, before they issue more information-sensitive securities, and lastly equity. Therefore, 
as firm profitability improves, leverage falls because retained earnings act as “inside equity” 
(Frank and Goyal, 2007). In contrast to the pecking order theory view that equity issues convey 
negative information to investors that causes stock prices to adjust, the market timing theory of 
capital structure (Baker and Wurgler, 2002) hypotheses that managers issue overvalued equity 
and repurchase it when the stock becomes undervalued.  
Developments in the literature show firms’ financing decisions could yield an optimal 
capital structure that is consistent with value maximization. This implies firms target their 
leverage and amend their financing following temporary deviations from target in order to return 
leverage towards its optimum. In the static trade-off model the adjustment is instantaneous albeit 
                                                          
5  Myers (2001, p. 96) suggests bankruptcy costs are part of agency costs: “conflicts (meaning agency issues) 
between debt and equity investors arise when there is a risk of default. If debt is totally free of default risk, debt 
holders have no interest in the income, value or risk of the firm. But if there is a chance of default, then 
shareholders gain at the expense of debt investors”.  
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incompatible with real-life scenarios; in contrast, dynamic trade-off models incorporate a gradual 
process of adjustment and it is this feature which differentiates the two models (see Flannery and 
Rangan, 2006; Frank and Goyal, 2007; DeAngelo et al, 2011). Adjustment is partial because of 
transactions costs (Leary and Roberts, 2005; Strebulaev, 2007).  
Accepting the premise of adjustment to target raises the question of how quickly does 
leverage adjust. Studies provide answers by estimating the mean reversion towards target though 
consensus is absent (see Fama and French, 2002; Lemmon et al, 2008; Huang and Ritter, 2009; 
Flannery and Rangan, 2006). Jalilvand and Harris (1984) and Auerbach (1985) suggest the 
variation in adjustment speeds reflects factors such as firm size, the type of debt, and price of 
capital. Other factors affect adjustment speeds: the option to issue transitory debt (DeAngelo et 
al, 2011); cash flow realizations (Faulkender et al, 2012); and institutional factors (Öztekin and 
Flannery, 2012).  
Empirical studies attempt to reconcile the trade-off and pecking order theories albeit with 
mixed results (see Titman and Wessells, 1988; Rajan and Zingales, 1995; Shyam-Sunder and 
Myers, 1999; Frank and Goyal, 2003). In contrast, in the dynamic model readjustment towards 
optimum leverage is determined by features of static trade-off and pecking order theories 
demonstrating that the theories are not mutually exclusive (see Fama and French, 2002; Flannery 
and Rangan, 2006; Antoniou et al, 2008). In a rational expectations framework, Ebrahim and 
Mathur (2013) theoretically prove the theories are complementary. Their model shows risky debt 
is at best Pareto-neutral to risk-free debt. Whereas this implies that low agency cost instruments 
(like risk-free debt) are more preferable, consistent with pecking order theory, it also illustrates 
that the subsequent choice of financing is risky debt, echoing static trade-off theory. In this 
context, pecking order precedes static trade-off as the welfare of agents depends on the type of 
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financing, but this ranking is contingent on the quality of assets employed by the firm (see 
Shleifer and Vishny, 1992).  
II.b Political patronage 
Connections between politicians and firms are commonplace. They exist in countries 
which restrict foreign investment and are considered corrupt as well as in more transparent and 
open economies. The sources of value to patronised firms include: preferential treatment by 
government-owned enterprises; lighter taxation; preferential treatment in competition for 
government contracts; and relaxed regulatory oversight of firms or stiffer regulatory oversight of 
rivals (Faccio, 2006).  
Which forms could political patronage take and how are the costs and benefits distributed? 
Frye and Iwasaki (2011) propose three hypotheses which demonstrate relations between 
government, state directors, and firms. First, government uses state directors to stop management 
looting firms. This assumes government is concerned with firm performance and the political 
repercussions of economic malaise, prompting government to place state directors at 
underperforming firms with intent to improve performance by disciplining management. Second, 
the rent-extraction hypothesis posits that firms expend effort to secure patronage to gain access 
to economic rents. Government sends state directors to firms in order to reward interested parties 
whose support is necessary for the retention of power. However, state directors could use their 
position for personal gain at the expense of social welfare and firm performance. Third, the 
collusion hypothesis implies government develops mutually beneficial forms of cooperation with 
firms. In exchange for rents accruing from the benefits of patronage, management offers public 
goods and other services to government. The empirical evidence is ambiguous. The collusion 
hypothesis holds in Russia (Frye and Iwasaki, 2011) and Hong Kong (Wong, 2010). In contrast, 
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Faccio (2006) in a cross-country study, and Fan et al (2007) for newly partially privatized 
Chinese firms find in favour of the rent extraction hypothesis. Lastly, Chang and Wong (2004) 
report evidence from China which suggests patronage takes various forms and produces different 
outcomes for firm performance.  
Cross-country data shows politically patronised firms are significantly more levered than 
non-connected firms. For the former, debt is higher at firms connected to government through 
ownership compared to state directors sitting on corporate boards (Faccio, 2010). It is pertinent 
to consider why patronised firms enjoy preferential access to debt financing and why lenders are 
more willing to extend credit to them. State ownership of banks is a contributory factor as is the 
informal relations between government and private-owned banks; both can produce irresponsible 
lending to government-approved firms even if credit risks are higher (Faccio, 2010; Bliss and 
Gul, 2012). In explanation, lenders could be irrational; receive direct support from government; 
be coerced into making poor loans to politicians’ friends; or lenders recognise patronised firms 
are more likely to benefit from government rescue than non-connected firms in the event of 
default. Patronised firms carry more debt than non-connected firms following bail-outs, which 
supports the proposition that lenders willingly finance patronised firms irrespective of operating 
performance (Faccio, 2006).  
II.c Political patronage in Malaysia 
Native Malays account for sixty per cent of the Malaysian population. The remainder is 
split amongst Chinese, Indians and other minor ethnic groups. Malaysia gained independence 
from Great Britain in 1957. At that time the economy narrowly focused on natural resources and 
native Malays held only three per cent of equity. To redress the imbalance, the government 
embarked on a series of populist economic transformation programs to promote industrialization: 
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the Import Substitution Industrialization (ISI) in the 1960s; and the Export Oriented 
Industrialization (EOI) in the 1980s (see Fraser et al., 2006). The government also sought to 
uplift the social status of Malays and increase their participation in business through the New 
Economic Policy (NEP, 1970 to 1990) and National Development Policy (NDP, 1991 to 2000). 
The NEP was implemented following race riots in 1969, while the NDP is a continuation under a 
new name. NEP and NDP confer special privileges to Malays: including access to higher 
education and participation in business particularly government projects. A key objective was to 
raise Malay equity ownership to thirty per cent and to reduce poverty levels. A New Economic 
Model supersedes the NDP seeking to promote fair and equal opportunities across races. 
In pursuing its development plan, the government adopted a relationship-based form of 
capitalism, disparagingly termed crony capitalisation (Johnson and Mitton, 2003), whereby 
selected firms receive political patronage or special incentives. Gomez and Jomo (1997) define 
patronage as preferential treatment given to businessmen who are either politicians or politically 
connected to government. Patronage lets connected parties capture various state rents in 
exchange for economic and political support. The government claimed patronage would improve 
the economy, address socio-economic imbalances, and redress competitive distortions facing 
native Malays.  
Political patronage in Malaysia has been practiced in three ways. First, the government 
establishes firms which it controls via a sovereign wealth fund, Khazanah Nasional Berhad. 
These Government-Linked Companies (GLCs) are pivotal institutions in the economy. Second, 
patronage is given to firms owned by government-sponsored institutional investors.
6
 Lastly, 
                                                          
6  The structure of these institutions is similar to mutual funds. 
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political patronage implies informal ties with politicians: connected firms are owned by relatives 
and/or friends of politicians, or by politicians themselves through proxy.  
Relationships became so widespread that by 1995 almost 20 per cent of the Malay ruling 
party’s division chairmen were millionaire businessmen (Gomez and Jomo, 1997). Faccio (2006) 
reports for Malaysia that connected firms account for 44 per cent of the top 50 firms: this cohort 
accounts for 28.24 per cent of market capitalization, one of the highest in the cross-country 
sample. Faccio et al (2006) investigate bail-outs of connected firms using a global sample and 
report 17 (of 51 bail-outs) occurs in Malaysia. To emphasise the importance of patronage, 
between July 1997 and August 1998 roughly 9 per cent of an estimated $60 billion loss in market 
value at connected firms is attributed to the fall in the expected value of patronage. The 
imposition of capital controls saw the figures rebound and of the $5 billion gain, 32 per cent is 
attributed to an increase in the value of patronage (Johnson and Mitton, 2003). 
The populist albeit controversial policies did transform the economy which is one of the 
largest and most industrialized in SE Asia. Nonetheless, financial crises accompanied the 
economic transformation including the 1997 Asian crisis. Although former Prime Minister, Dr 
Mahathir Mohamed infamously chastised foreign speculators for ripening the conditions for the 
crisis, the financial practices of Malaysian firms also contributed. Previously, Malaysian firms 
relied heavily on external borrowings especially from banks which supplied between 52 to 82 per 
cent of external financing between 1990 and 1997 compared to between 11 to 40 per cent for 
new equity issues (Suto, 2003).  
Financial liberalization in 1989 altered the structure of corporate debt and long-term 
funding became an important source of finance (Schmukler and Vesperoni, 2006). Some 
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commentators contend the speculative attack on the currency in 1997 triggered the inevitable 
because the crisis had been in the making for many years due to firms’ financial practices. 
Borsuk (1993) identifies the easy access to bank loans especially for patronised firms, which was 
enhanced by state ownership of several banks (Gomez and Jomo, 1997). For these reasons, bank 
lending or debt finance became the largest component of capital structure, which is unsurprising 
because alternative sources of financing were either underdeveloped or more expensive. Using a 
sample of 500 publicly listed non-financial firms from 2001 to 2004, Bliss and Gul (2012) find 
patronised firms are more highly levered; they are charged higher interests rates on borrowings 
since lenders’ perceive these firms as relatively more risky because patronised firms are more 
likely to report a loss and have negative equity. 
The crisis damaged the Malaysian economy. A contraction in GDP and the stock market of 
around six and 80 per cent, respectively, occurred in 1998. In contrast to her neighbours, the 
Malaysian government imposed capital controls rather than accept conditional support from the 
IMF. It also pegged the ringgit to the US dollar to insulate the economy from further speculative 
attacks and to assist restructuring efforts. The government founded three agencies to restructure 
the financial sector and corporate balance sheets: the Corporate Debt Restructuring Committee 
(CDRC) to restructure debt; Danamodal to recapitalize banks; and an asset management entity 
Danaharta to buy bad loans from banks. 
III. Methodological framework  
Equation [1] shows the optimal capital structure captured by the debt-to-equity or 
leverage ratio Υ*it for the i
th
 firm at time t: 
Υ*it = α0 + 
j
βj Xjit + αi + αt + εit [1] 
13 
 
 
 
Where: i represents firms ranging from 1 to N; t denotes time ranging from 1 to T; X captures (J) 
firm-specific and time varying characteristics; αi and αt represent unobserved firm-specific and 
time-specific effects; εit is an error term assumed to be independently identical and normally 
distributed with zero mean and constant variance, εit ≈ i.i.d. N (0, σ
2
). 
In a perfect (frictionless) world with no adjustment costs, firms respond to variations in Xjit 
by changing capital structure to equal the optimal leverage ratio in a process termed complete 
adjustment. It implies that at any point in time the leverage ratio should equal its target or 
optimum level, Yit = Y
*
it. Therefore, a change in leverage exactly equals the change required for 
a firm to attain its optimum: Yit -Yit-1 = Y
*
it - Yit-1. 
Given imperfect knowledge and adjustments costs, firms do not adjust instantaneously 
towards optimal leverage. The partial adjustment model incorporates this result through a 
parameter, λ that measures the speed of adjustment. λ is inversely proportional to transactions 
costs and ranges from 0 to 1. Cross-country studies emphasise the sensitivity of leverage to 
institutional factors such as legal traditions including protection of property rights and 
enforcement of creditor rights, and to the dominance of one type of financial structure over 
another (Rajan and Zingales, 1995; González and González, 2008; Antoniou et al, 2008; Öztekin 
and Flannery, 2012).  
Equation [2] shows the partial adjustment model which is rewritten in equation [3]: 
Yit -Yit-1 = λit (Y
*
it - Yit-1) [2] 
Yit = (1- λit) Yit-1 + λit Y
*
it [3] 
To remove the unobservable optimal leverage, Y
*
it, substitute equation [1] into [3] to derive 
equation [4], and re-write as equation [5] below: 
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Yit = (1- λit) Yit-1 + λit (α0 + 
j
βj Xjit + αi + αt + εit) [4] 
Yit = φ0 + θ0Yit-1 + 
j
θj Xjit + ηi + ηt + µit [5] 
Where: φ0 = λit α0, θ0 = (1-λit), θj = λit βj, ηi = λit αi, ηt = λit αt, and µit = λit εit. 
Equation [5] contains a lagged dependent variable and dynamic panel data methods are 
used to estimate it. Although first differencing removes time-invariant unobserved heterogeneity 
it could produce correlation between the transformed lagged term and the transformed error term, 
which would bias λ. In solution, Arellano and Bond (1991) propose the difference GMM 
estimator (Generalized Methods of Moments) which differences equation [5] to remove time-
invariant fixed effects and uses levels of the lagged dependent variable to instrument the first 
difference of the lag. However, difference GMM could produce unbiased estimates if levels of 
endogenous variables are weak instruments for first-differenced variables, and if the lagged 
levels and first differenced variables are serially correlated (Arellano and Bover, 1995; Blundell 
and Bond, 1998). In response, Blundell and Bond (1998) propose the system GMM estimator. It 
combines the first differencing approach with a levels regression using lagged first differences as 
instruments. The system estimator is more efficient than its difference counterpart because it uses 
a more efficient set of instruments to counter the weak instruments problem.  
We use system GMM to estimate the partial adjustment model to control for endogeneity 
which could arise in dynamic capital structure models. Flannery and Hankins (2013), noting 
differences in reported adjustment speeds, simulate a dataset and apply several commonly used 
methods in a horserace for effectiveness in resolving econometric anomalies such as endogeneity 
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and censored dependent variables. Their results demonstrate the suitability of the system GMM 
estimator from both theoretical and empirical standpoints which reaffirms findings elsewhere 
(Wintoki et al, 2012; Öztekin and Flannery, 2012).
7
  
We augment equation [5] with dummy variables to control for time-invariant industry 
effects because leverage varies across industries (Harris and Raviv, 1991) and affects capital 
structure decisions (MacKay and Phillips, 2005; Miao, 2005; Öztekin and Flannery, 2012). Other 
dummies control for year-specific effects common to all firms though variable through time 
(Antoniou et al, 2008). To check specification, we run two tests: the Sargan test for over-
identifying restrictions; and Arellano and Bond’s test for zero autocorrelation which determines 
if the first differenced residuals are free from second order serial correlation. 
IV. Core factors 
The dependent variable is Leverage measured by the book value of firms’ total debt-to-
total assets ratios.
8
 Whereas others debate the choice of book or market value (Flannery and 
Rangan, 2006; Frank and Goyal, 2009) our choice draws on survey evidence (Graham and 
Harvey, 2001) which reports many managers claim not to rebalance capital structure following 
equity movements because of the high adjustment costs of continuous rebalancing. In the 
dynamic panel model setting, adjustment speed is ascertained from the coefficient on the one-
period lagged dependent variable, Leveraget-1. We use the core factors (Frank and Goyal, 2009) 
                                                          
7  Pooled OLS and fixed-effects estimators are unbiased under certain assumptions which are often absent in 
corporate finance data (Wintoki et al, 2012). Unobservable heterogeneity arises when errors are not 
independent nor identically distributed making the OLS estimators biased. Fixed-effects estimators correct for 
serial correlation in the residuals arising from unobserved firm-specific heterogeneity. However, the estimator 
is consistent only if the current values of the explanatory variables are completely independent of past values 
of the dependent variable. 
8  Total debt equals all interest bearing and capitalized lease obligations. Total assets is the sum of total current 
assets, long term receivables, investment in unconsolidated subsidiaries, other investments, net property plant 
and equipment, and other assets. 
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to identify the determinants of the capital structure of Malaysian firms.
9
 We next discuss the 
factors and expectations regarding leverage. 
Size equals the natural logarithm of total assets (in ringgit billion at 2000 prices). Larger, 
more diversified firms face a lower risk of default because of lower earnings and net cash flow 
volatilities (Fama and French, 2002). Assuming size reasonably proxies for age; larger, more 
reputable firms face lower debt-related agency problems in debt markets (Fama and Jensen, 
1983). Size also proxies for capital market access (Fama and French, 2002) and fixed financing 
costs (Kurshev and Strebulaev, 2006). Trade-off theory predicts a positive relation between 
leverage and size. Although pecking order theory is ambiguous, it suggests an inverse 
relationship because larger, better-known firms could more easily issue equity than small firms if 
adverse selection problems are severe.  
Profitability equals the ratio of earnings before interest and taxes-to-total assets. Static 
trade-off models contend that more profitable firms hold more debt because expected bankruptcy 
costs are lower and interest tax shields more valuable. Furthermore, and from an agency 
perspective, the free cash flow theory contends that profitable firms use more debt as a 
mechanism to control managers (Jensen, 1986). In contrast, pecking order theory stipulates that 
profitable firms generate higher cash flows and use internal funds for financing instead of raising 
debt or equity (Myers and Majluf, 1984). The result shows more profitable firms use less debt to 
deliver an inverse relationship with leverage. Long run evidence from the US shows the 
declining (albeit statistically significant) importance of profitability as a predictor of leverage in 
                                                          
9  We do not use taxes as a proxy variable as the information on personal taxes of investors is not available. We 
also have difficulty in constructing a proxy for non-debt tax shields. 
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the 1980s and 1990s compared to earlier periods. It suggests a willingness by equity markets to 
fund currently unprofitable firms with good growth opportunities (Frank and Goyal, 2003).  
Growth equals the market-to-book ratio of equity and proxies for firms’ investment 
opportunities (Barclay and Smith, 1995). Static trade-off theory predicts an inverse relation 
between leverage and Growth because growth firms face the underinvestment problem. This 
arises because firms with risky debt face incentives to under invest in positive net present value 
projects since shareholders bear the full cost of projects but receive only a fraction of any 
increase in firm value as part goes to debt holders (Myers, 1977). For high growth firms, it is 
easier for shareholders to increase risk without it being detected by debt holders, which makes 
debt more costly for these firms. Growth firms could find it easier to issue equity with debt being 
less attractive as a disciplining factor (Jensen, 1986). Pecking order theory suggests growth firms 
should accumulate more debt over time providing profitability remains constant, which infers a 
positive relation with leverage. However, empirical evidence shows high growth firms are less 
levered because of a lower debt capacity (Lemmon and Zender, 2010).  
Tangibility equals the ratio of net tangible assets-to-total assets. Large holdings of tangible 
assets could serve as collateral to lower the risk of lenders suffering the agency costs of debt like 
risk shifting, which could occur if shareholders substitute high-risk assets for low-risk assets 
(Rajan and Zingales, 1995; Frank and Goyal, 2009). Scott (1977) shows firms could borrow at 
lower interest rates if debt is secured by tangible assets. Pecking order theory predicts the 
opposite albeit with a caveat. It surmises the low information asymmetry associated with tangible 
assets makes it cheaper for firms to issue equity implying firms with higher tangibility are less 
levered. However, if adverse selection exists about firm assets, tangibility will worsen the 
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problem and could lead to higher debt. Nevertheless, empirical evidence from 10 developing 
countries supports trade-off theory (Booth et al, 2001).  
Industry is the median leverage ratio for industries across t periods. Industry leverage 
exerts considerable predictive power on capital structure decisions. Evidence shows firms adjust 
leverage towards industry-level norms (Harris and Raviv, 1991; Hovakimian et al, 2001; 
MacKay and Phillips, 2005; Miao, 2005; Flannery and Rangan, 2006; Lemmon et al, 2008; 
Faulkender et al, 2012). Industry could also proxy for omitted industry-specific factors which 
affect firms’ financing decisions (Frank and Goyal, 2009). As noted above, the model includes 
dummy variables to account for unobserved industry-level heterogeneity (Öztekin and Flannery, 
2012). Whilst trade-off theory predicts a positive relationship between Leverage and Industry, 
the pecking order theory is ambiguous; it contends Industry matters only to the extent it proxies 
for firms’ financing deficits (Frank and Goyal, 2009). 
Volatility equals the ratio RoAit-to-σRoAt where σRoAt is the standard deviation of return on 
assets for period t. It controls for firm risk (Lemmon et al, 2008; Frank and Goyal, 2009) and by 
construction resembles a proxy for financial distress costs (Miguel and Pindado, 2001). It also 
contains information about firm cash flow since more profitable firms are expected to have 
higher cash flows. Cash flow realizations exert significant first-order effects on firm’s 
convergence towards target leverage ratios (Faulkender et al, 2012). Higher volatility lowers the 
probability that tax shields will be fully utilized and is associated with less debt under trade-off 
theory. More volatile or risky firms are likely to face a severe adverse selection problem, which 
under pecking order theory implies a positive relation between volatility and leverage.  
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V. Data 
From DataStream we source annual financial and accounting data for 751 Malaysian firms 
from all industrial sectors between 1988 and 2009. We filter the sample to exclude financial 
firms and utilities, and omit negative and extreme values for Growth to avoid distorting its 
relationship with Leverage (Almeida and Campello, 2007). After filtering, the unbalanced panel 
dataset contains 7,042 firm-year observations. Approximately 11 per cent of observations are for 
politically patronised firms which account for roughly 7 per cent of the number of sample firms.  
Table 1 shows correlations between Leverage and the firm-specific variables for the whole 
period and for sub-periods before and after the Asian crisis. Generally speaking, the magnitude 
of correlations between Leverage and the covariates is greater pre-crisis (except for Size and 
Tangibility which are higher post-crisis). Leverage is inversely correlated to Profitability and 
Volatility and positively associated with all other variables. Table 1 also shows significant post-
crisis correlations between Size and other covariates (except Growth), which we do not observe 
pre-crisis. The increasing importance of Tangibility post-crisis is evident.  
[Insert Table 1 here] 
Table 2a presents the averages of the firm-specific variables by industry and for politically 
patronised and non-connected firms across 1988 to 2009. On average, patronised firms are larger 
though not for all industries. For six of eight industrial sectors, average leverage is often notably 
higher for patronised firms. Tables 2b and 2c represent the data by year. On average, from 1988 
to 1995, patronised firms carry up to twice as much debt. We conjecture the high average 
leverage of patronised firms reflects informally government support. In the event of financial 
distress, government is expected to support patronised firms suggesting these firms are more 
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likely to service debts (Shleifer and Vishny, 1992). Although on average patronised firms carry 
relatively more debt post-crisis the difference with the average non-connected firm is less 
obvious. On average, patronised are larger and marginally more profitable from 2001. 
Examining trends in Profitability shows the average non-connected firm is much less profitable 
post-crisis compared to pre-crisis, which is not unsurprising given movements in Malaysian GDP 
following the onset of the crisis and the reduced investment opportunities (Growth) for all firms. 
[Insert Tables 2a-c here] 
VI. Results 
V1.a Dynamic capital structure 
We use system GMM to estimate the dynamic capital structure model in equation [5] for 
all firms from 1988 to 2009 to determine (i) if Malaysian firms adjust to target leverage; and (ii) 
to quantify the speed of adjustment. Column (1) of Table 3 shows the estimated coefficients and 
the results of the diagnostic tests. The p-values for the Sargan and zero-autocorrelation tests 
indicate the null hypotheses are not accepted, which confirms the model is neither over-identified 
nor are the residuals affected by second order serial correlation. Leverageit-1 is the coefficient for 
the lagged dependent variable and is significant at the 1 per cent level. From the value of this 
coefficient (0.7162), we infer that Malaysian firms adjust leverage towards an optimal level and 
the speed of adjustment is approximately 28 per cent per annum. In the context of findings 
reported elsewhere from dynamic panel models, the adjustment speed of Malaysian firms is 
broadly consistent with or at the upper end of ranges reported for (mostly) US firms by Lemmon 
et al (2008; around 25 per cent), Huang and Ritter (2009; 17-23 per cent), and Faulkender et al 
(2012; 23-26 per cent), comparable with Frank and Goyal (2009; around 27 per cent), yet below 
Flannery and Rangan (2006; over 30 per cent).  
21 
 
 
 
[Insert Table 3 here] 
Whilst we confirm the capital structure of Malaysian firms is affected across time by firm-
specific characteristics, the results conclusively demonstrate that neither static trade-off nor 
pecking order theories exclusively predict capital structure. Of the six predictors of corporate 
leverage, three relationships each support trade-off and pecking order theories. That we cannot 
find in favour of either theory constitutes empirical support for a theoretical result which derives 
from amalgamating the theories under a rational expectations framework (Ebrahim and Mathur, 
2013). It also supports dynamic trade-off theory (see also Antoniou et al, 2008). 
The coefficient for Size shows larger Malaysian firms carry more debt and suggesting these 
firms face lower debt-related agency problems in debt markets (Fama and Jensen, 1983) and 
hold better access to capital markets (Fama and French, 2002). Whereas the positive coefficient 
on Size is consistent with trade-off theories, the inverse relationship between leverage and 
Profitability supports the pecking order explanation that profitable Malaysian firms with 
relatively high cash flow use internal funds as finance which lowers their reliance upon debt 
and/or equity (Myers and Majluf, 1984).  
Pecking order theory explains observed positive relations between leverage and both 
Growth and Volatility. In interpretation, the former result suggests Malaysian firms with better 
investment opportunities do not suffer the underinvestment problem, and over time could 
accumulate more debt assuming constant profitability, whilst the latter result implies that risky 
Malaysian firms hold more debt because of severe adverse selection problems. Malaysian firms 
holding large amounts of tangible assets are significantly more levered supporting trade-off 
theory. This suggests Tangibility reduces the agency costs of debt through its proxy for collateral 
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(Rajan and Zingales, 1995), and/or interest expenses are lower when debt is secured by tangible 
assets (Scott, 1977). Our result for Malaysia confirms Booth et al (2001) for 10 developing 
countries. Lastly, we find a large coefficient revealing a positive relationship between leverage 
and Industry suggesting that Malaysian firms adjust their leverage ratios towards industrial sector 
benchmarks. This result supports trade-off theory (see Hovakimian et al, 2001; Flannery and 
Rangan, 2006; Lemmon et al, 2008; Frank and Goyal, 2009; and Faulkender et al, 2012). The 
magnitude of the coefficients contains information regarding which factors are economically 
meaningful determinants of capital structure. Our results signal the economic importance of 
Profitability (-0.2872) and Industry (0.2796) in determining corporate leverage.  
We next consider the robustness of the main results. As a first step, we exclude the years 
1998 and 1999 when the Asian crisis peaked. To determine if the crisis precipitated a change in 
firm behaviour in terms of firms’ financing decisions, we construct sub-samples to capture the 
before (1988-1997) and after (2000-2009) periods. Earlier, section II.b referenced arguments 
stipulating that one outcome of the crisis could be to curtail firms’ reliance on debt financing. 
Therefore, we re-estimate equation [5] by sub-period and present the results in columns (2-3) of 
Table 3. The data reject over-identification and second order serial correlation.  
The speeds of adjustment are similar across periods. Between 1988 and 1997, corporate 
leverage adjusts towards target by approximately 31 per cent per annum; post-crisis the 
comparator is roughly 28 per cent. The signs on coefficients confirm the relationships between 
Leverage and firm-specific variables hold across time except Volatility which turns insignificant. 
Nevertheless we observe some notable changes in economic importance: for instance, the 
magnitude on Profitability falls from -0.4626 (pre-crisis) to -0.2527 (post-crisis). A declining 
ability for Profitability to predict Leverage for US firms was noted earlier, and explained by a 
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willingness of equity markets to fund currently unprofitable firms with good growth 
opportunities (Frank and Goyal, 2003). This result concurs with the correlation analysis showing 
firms are less profitable post-crisis which we contend affects their ability to finance new projects 
from retained earnings. Similarly, post-crisis Industry falls in economic importance (0.4725 to 
0.1641) albeit whilst remaining significant. This could be interpreted as suggesting that the 
targeting of industry benchmarks becomes less important over time. In contrast, the relationship 
between Leverage and Tangibility turns significant post-crisis whilst the magnitude on Size 
virtually doubles. In summary, the comparison of estimated coefficients across time shows the 
crisis did exert some effects on firms’ financing decisions.   
The panel dataset comprises a greater number of observations post-crisis. Therefore, and as 
another test for robustness, we confine the sample to 182 firms which operate continuously 
between 1988 and 2009. In Table 3 columns (4-5) show the re-estimated coefficients for the sub-
periods. Generally, the signs and significance reconfirm the previous findings. We note some 
differences in economic importance: for instance, for the limited sample and across 1988 to 2009 
the coefficients on Profitability and Industry equal -0.1548 and 0.4518 compared with -0.2872 
and 0.2796 for the unrestricted sample. For the restricted sample, targeting industry benchmarks 
is economically and statistically significant. The predictive power of Industry increases post-
crisis for the restricted sample; its coefficient is over twice the size of the comparator in the 
unrestricted sample. We contend sample size is not a factor driving the results.
10
 
  
                                                          
10  In unreported regressions we apply the GMM difference estimator as another robustness check. The results are 
consistent with the main findings and are available upon request. 
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V1.b The effect of political patronage  
 Notwithstanding that patronage is a valuable resource, only a few studies investigate how 
political connections affect firms’ strategic decision-making and long run performance (see 
Section I). We examine the effect of political patronage on firms’ leverage decisions using a 
natural experiment approach. Assuming the Asian crisis constitutes an exogenous shock to 
Malaysian firms, we apply a difference-in-differences model to determine if the leverage of 
patronised firms significantly differs from the trend for Malaysian firms post shock. We contend 
firms’ strategic decision-making is different immediately following an exogenous shock from the 
subsequent recovery period. To consider this proposition, we specify our model to contain two 
post-shock periods: 1998 to 2001 capture the duration of the crisis (Laeven and Valencia, 2008); 
2002 to 2009 captures the recovery period. A dummy variable identifies each period equal to 
unity for 1998 to 2001 (2002 to 2009) and zero otherwise. In order to derive a precise evaluation 
of the strategic reactions of firms, we interact the period dummies with the firm-specific 
covariates for (i) all firms; and (ii) patronised firms. This identification strategy exploits both the 
reaction of leverage to the cross-time change in firm behaviour immediately after the shock and 
over the longer run, and differences in the reaction of leverage between patronised firms and 
non-connected firms during and after the crisis. Equation [6] presents the model: 
Yit = 1Di + 2E1t + 3Di*E1t +∑ 𝛽𝑗
𝑞
𝑗=𝑞  Xit-1*E1t +∑ 𝛽𝑘
𝑞
𝑘=𝑞 Xit-1*E1t*Di 
+22E2t + 33Di*E2t +∑ 𝛽𝑙
𝑞
𝑙=𝑞  Xit-1*E2t +∑ 𝛽𝑚
𝑞
𝑚=𝑞 Xit-1*E2t*Di + it 
[6] 
Where Yit is the leverage ratio; Di is a dummy equal to unity if a firm holds political patronage 
and zero otherwise. For the purposes of classification, a firm is considered patronised on 
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satisfaction of any one of three criteria: (i) identified by Gomez and Jomo (1997) as having 
political connections; (ii) if a firm is controlled by the government-owned sovereign wealth fund, 
Khazanah Nasional Berhad; (iii) if a firm’s institutional investors are government sponsored 
entities like Permodalan Nasional Berhad; E1t is a dummy variable equal to unity for years 1998 to 
2001 and zero otherwise; E2t is a dummy variable equal to unity for years 2002 to 2009 and zero 
otherwise; the Xit-1 are the one period lagged core factors. Whilst lagging ensures causality runs 
from covariates to leverage thereby ameliorating simultaneity concerns, a potentially endogenous 
relationship could occur if firms self-select to be politically patronised. In their detailed analysis 
of political relationships in Malaysia, Gomez and Jomo (1997) explain that connections of firms 
to politicians tended to be based on chance personal histories between businessmen and rising 
politicians. Johnson and Mitton (2003) contend that because relationships predate associations of 
these businessmen with particular firms, there are no grounds to believe that unobserved firm-
level characteristics determine the political patronage of firms.  
The coefficient β1 measures the extent to which the leverage of patronised firms differs 
from others across time. The raw data unambiguously show patronised firms are more debt-
intensive which realises expectations of β1>0. The coefficient β2 identifies the response of 
Malaysian firms’ leverage during 1998 to 2001 relative to pre-crisis. A positive (negative) 
coefficient signals higher (lower) debt. β3 is the coefficient on the interaction of Di and E1t and 
measures the effect of the exogenous shock on patronised firm leverage between 1998 and 2001. 
We apply the same procedure to measure how leverage responds post-crisis (2002 to 2009), E2t. 
The coefficient β22 indicates the response of Malaysian firms’ leverage whilst β33 identifies if the 
leverage of patronised firms differs from the trend in E2t. Supposing Malaysian firms 
26 
 
 
 
strategically opt to carry less debt, say, due to equity market developments or a lessening of 
agency-related problems, we would expect β22<0.  
We interact each covariate with E1t and E2t. The coefficients βj show how corporate 
leverage responds to capital structure decisions, pertaining to each core factor, made by 
Malaysian firms in the crisis. In order to determine if patronage affects such relationships, each 
interaction term is interacted with Di with βk measuring the effects. The coefficients βl and βm 
measure the effects of firm-specific variables on capital structure for Malaysian firms over 2002 
and 2009 and if those effects differ for patronised firms. 
 Before presenting the results, we present the evolution of average annual leverage for 
patronised firms and non-connected firms from 1988 to 2009. From circa 1993-94 the rate at 
which Malaysian firms increase debt exceeds asset growth. Figure 1 demonstrates a convergence 
in leverage for patronised and non-connected firms just prior to the exogenous shock. After the 
shock, the average leverage of patronised firms peaks to suggest government intervention. 
Although non-connected firm leverage displays a similar pattern the magnitude of the jump is 
smaller. A considerable difference between the leverage of each cohort appears post-crisis. For 
non-connected firms, leverage falls quickly and is constant from 2001. In comparison the 
leverage of patronised firms is more variable though also trending downward. By 2009 the 
average holdings of debt roughly equate and compare to levels circa 1995 to 1996. 
[Insert Figure 1 here] 
Next we consider the parallel trends assumption which contends the trend in leverage for 
patronised and non-connected firms would roughly equate in the absence of the shock. Figure 2 
plots the evolution of annual average leverage for both cohorts until the shock. Leverage shows a 
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similar trajectory from 1992 with minor differences circa 1995 to 1997, thereby satisfying the 
parallel trends assumption and inferring non-connected firms are a suitable control group.  
[Insert Figure 2 here] 
 Table 4 shows the results of estimations of equation [6]. We test for robustness by 
changing the source of identification. Column (1) reports the results of the model 1 which robust 
clusters the standard errors. Model 2 in column (2) clusters the standard errors by firm to control 
for serial correlation in the dependent variable. Model 3 in column (3) augments model 2 by 
including dummies for years and industries to control for effects that are not directly observed. 
For instance, leverage could be influenced by institutional factors, such as, prevailing economic 
conditions and business cycle effects, legal environment, regulatory framework, and economic 
development. Model 4 changes the source of identification and we estimate a model with 
industry-year effects to account for shocks which have an industry-specific component that could 
affect leverage. Lastly, model 5 controls for firm-industry effects to accommodate unobservable 
invariant industry factors and unobserved firm-level factors that could lead to differences in 
leverage across industries. 
[Insert Table 4 here] 
 Two main results emerge. First, the exogenous shock causes Malaysian firms to 
reconfigure capital structure during the crisis, and to subsequently revise their decisions post-
crisis. Second, the results demonstrate that political patronage explains differences in leverage 
but only during the crisis. These findings are robust. We elaborate further on other important 
results. Table 4 rejects claims that patronised firms hold significantly higher levels of debt 
because β1 is mostly insignificant. In crisis period, E1t, the coefficients for β2 show Malaysian 
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firms de-lever in an economically meaningful as well as statistically significant way compared to 
pre-crisis. Aside from 1998 when debt levels temporarily benefit from the September imposition 
of capital controls, the trend in leverage for Malaysian firms is driven by lower debt holdings. 
The β3 coefficients show patronised firms reduce gearing to a greater extent compared to non-
connected firms during the crisis. 
The βj and βk measure the effects of each core factor on leverage for Malaysian firms and 
patronised firms during the crisis. It is difficult to unequivocally accept that patronised firms 
behave differently in terms of capital structure decision-making. Whereas profitable Malaysian 
firms became less levered during the crisis, profitable patronised firms increased debt (βj2 and 
βk2). However, patronised firms increasingly targeted industrial benchmark leverage (βk5). The 
results emphasise the economic importance of Profitability and Industry (the statistical evidence 
is mostly supportive) in predicting corporate leverage during the crisis. In addition, strong 
statistical, though less compelling economic, evidence shows patronised firms with lower 
Volatility held less debt during the crisis (see βk6). For Malaysian firms debt is associated with 
larger firms (βj1 on Size), better investment opportunities (βj3 for Growth), and more tangible 
assets (βj4 on Tangibility). We find no evidence of differences in the relations between these 
factors and leverage for patronised firms. 
Our next concern is what happens to leverage post-crisis for Malaysian firms, and do the 
observed differences for patronised firms continue, and if so, does the importance of individual 
factors remain constant. The results demonstrate that Malaysian firms continue to operate with 
lower levels of leverage post-crisis compared to pre-crisis (β22). Lower debt ratios could reflect 
both a deepening of equity and other nascent financial markets and a weakening of agency-
related problems. Although β33 is positive and suggests patronised firms are more levered, the 
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coefficients are statistically insignificant and economically unimportant (Figure 2 clearly 
indicates a post-crisis convergence in debt levels for patronised firms and non-connected firms). 
The βl coefficients identify the effects of individual factors on leverage for Malaysian firms. The 
signs on the coefficients remain consistent: more profitable firms are less levered (βl2), whereas 
firm size (βl1), growth opportunities (βl3), and the amount of tangible assets (βl4) positively affect 
leverage. A notable change, however, is the greater importance of benchmarking target leverage 
to industry medians (βl5). Indeed, Industry and Profitability are the most economically important 
predictors of capital structure for Malaysian firms. We note also the rising economic importance 
of Tangibility. The evidence clearly shows patronage exerts little effect upon leverage post-crisis, 
though we observe some mixed statistical evidence to suggest industry benchmarking (βm5) is a 
less important determinant of capital structure for patronised firms; certainly, the results 
emphasise the economic importance of Industry albeit in two models.  
VII. Conclusion 
This paper examines the capital structure of Malaysian firms with two goals in mind. First, 
we investigate if Malaysian firms target an optimal leverage and using six core factors we 
establish the determinants of capital structure. We obtain our results from system GMM 
estimation of a dynamic partial adjustment model. Leverage is estimated to adjust to target at a 
rate of approximately 28 per cent per annum, which compares to speeds reported elsewhere for 
other countries. Our analysis of the determinants of capital structure reconciles the trade-off and 
pecking order theories and we demonstrate neither theory dominates. Rather, our evidence 
supports a theoretical model showing the theories are complementary (see Ebrahim and Mathur, 
2013), and is also consistent with other empirical studies (see Antoniou et al, 2008; Frank and 
Goyal, 2009). Subsequent robustness checks confirm the determinants of capital structure are 
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generally consistent over time, though we observe some changes in the economic importance of 
factors, such as, profitability and benchmarking leverage to industry standard.  
The second objective is to determine the effect of political patronage on capital structure 
following an exogenous shock. Using a difference-in-differences approach we determine if the 
leverage of politically patronised firms significantly differs from the overall trend for Malaysian 
firms following the Asian crisis. We consider if leverage decisions vary between an in-crisis 
period and a post-crisis recovery period. The results unambiguously demonstrate Malaysian 
firms amend capital structure during the crisis and politically patronised firms de-lever quicker 
than non-connected firms. This finding is consistent with claims that politically connected firms 
suffer more when an exogenous shock limits government’s ability to provide privileges and 
subsidies (Johnson and Mitton, 2003). One reason for this largely unexpected result is because 
the severity of the exogenous shock increases systemic risk which causes the government to 
rethink its support in case patronage creates a backlash to threaten the future of an incumbent 
government. An alternative explanation views patronised firms as safer bets because of implicit 
government guarantee and are unwilling to seek further debt capital when the price is high. 
However, policy makers must exercise caution as to the amount of support they confer to 
selected firms in order to avoid sending an erroneous signal to both investors and markets. First, 
political interference in selected sectors of the economy can undermine the competitive edge of 
firms in the global economy. Second, populist policies can disenfranchise groups particularly 
minorities, which could cause such groups to relocate physically (i.e., extricating their human 
capital) overseas or move their financial capital overseas. These reactions can impede economic 
growth in the long run. Investors should recognise the cost of government support. Since 
political support extracts rents it confers low returns. Furthermore, a government’s lifeline 
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evaporates when it is most needed i.e., during a severe economic downturn when the private 
sector needs to resort to its own wits to come out unscathed and stronger than before. 
In recovery, patronised firms are more highly levered than non-connected firms but the 
findings are insignificant. Nevertheless, it indicates at least a partial return to the benefits of 
patronage and possibly reflects the activities of government restructuring agencies. This suggests 
the Malaysian government was better able to protect patronised firms once it had imposed capital 
controls and established restructuring agencies to deal with corporate debt. Whilst strategic 
decisions pertaining to core factors can explain revisions to capital structure in recovery, no 
concrete evidence shows patronised firms behave differently. Our analysis suggests political 
patronage exerts a causal impact on leverage during crisis episodes only. We believe our paper 
provides insights to understanding the effect of exogenous shocks on financing and how political 
patronage influences strategic decision-making (in the context of emerging markets and relation-
based economies).  
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Table 1: Correlation coefficients: 1988-2009 and sub-periods 
 
Leverage Size Profit Growth Tang. Industry Volatility 
1988-2009 
       Leverage 1 
      Size 0.1985* 1 
     Profitability -0.2356* 0.2132* 1 
    Growth 0.0275* 0.0591* 0.2285* 1 
   Tangibility  0.1853* 0.1354* -0.0209 -0.0440* 1 
  Industry 0.2152* 0.2105* 0.0164 -0.0386* 0.1097* 1 
 Volatility -0.2401* 0.2227* 0.9614* 0.2957* -0.0049 -0.0253* 1 
1988-1997 
      Leverage 1 
      Size 0.0789* 1 
     Profitability -0.4317* 0.0153 1 
    Growth 0.0882* -0.2319* 0.2357* 1 
   Tangibility 0.0586 0.0131 -0.0041 -0.0484 1 
  Industry 0.3122* 0.0398 -0.1946* 0.0862* -0.0484 1 
 Volatility -0.4329* -0.0039 0.9833* 0.2180* 0.0104 -0.2077* 1 
2000-2009 
      Leverage 1 
      Size 0.2290* 1 
     Profitability -0.1909* 0.2214* 1 
    Growth 0.0280* 0.0218 0.1942* 1 
   Tangibility 0.2107* 0.1434* -0.0322* -0.0797* 1 
  Industry 0.1888* 0.2578* 0.0973* -0.0430* 0.1563* 1 
 Volatility -0.1884* 0.2115* 0.9823* 0.2119* -0.0272* 0.0806* 1 
 
Notes:   LEVERAGE = debt-to-total assets; SIZE = natural logarithm of real assets (2000 prices); 
TANGIBILITY = fixed assets-to-total assets; GROWTH = market-to-book value of equity; 
PROFITABILITY = earnings before interest and taxes-to-total assets; INDUSTRY = median debt ratio 
of industry; VOLATILITY = RoAit/σRoAt. 
* Statistically significant the 5% level. 
  
40 
 
 
 
Table 2a: Descriptive Statistics: Mean values by industry, 1988-2009 
Industry Obs. Lev. Size Profit Growth Tang. Ind. Vol. 
Politically connected firms 
Basic Materials 25 0.1809 368.0 0.0345 1.4546 0.2510 0.2688 0.3658 
Consumer Goods 159 0.1601 1487.2 0.1063 1.9817 0.4261 0.1533 1.0215 
Consumer Services 212 0.2668 2443.5 0.0714 1.9850 0.4129 0.2067 0.6609 
Health Care 29 0.3108 1249.9 0.0636 1.7194 0.3905 0.2299 0.5136 
Industrials 240 0.2499 3422.5 0.0538 1.5574 0.3916 0.2083 0.5065 
Oil & Gas 7 0.4115 1633.9 0.0905 2.1561 0.1802 0.3066 0.7280 
Technology 63 0.3591 1938.9 0.0495 2.2885 0.2918 0.1641 0.5130 
Telecommunications 30 0.2120 18700.0 0.0299 1.9748 0.4649 0.1552 0.3807 
Non-politically connected firms 
Basic Materials 724 0.2540 682.2 0.0573 1.4825 0.4143 0.2543 0.5134 
Consumer Goods 1,810 0.1982 517.2 0.0669 1.8533 0.4288 0.1624 0.6075 
Consumer Services 449 0.2060 1909.1 0.0728 1.5079 0.3915 0.2108 0.6755 
Health Care 127 0.2002 235.3 0.0863 2.2587 0.4647 0.2099 0.6791 
Industrials 2,454 0.2209 417.0 0.0440 1.4159 0.3653 0.2061 0.3928 
Oil & Gas 192 0.2433 1662.2 0.0790 2.3640 0.4747 0.2575 0.7213 
Technology 488 0.1211 190.8 -0.0167 1.7678 0.2221 0.0902 -0.0504 
Telecommunications 33 0.0808 952.8 0.0738 3.0745 0.3197 0.0884 0.5856 
 
Notes:   LEVERAGE = debt-to-total assets; SIZE = total assets, bn (2000 prices); TANGIBILITY = fixed 
assets-to-total assets; GROWTH = market-to-book value of equity; PROFITABILITY = earnings 
before interest and taxes-to-total assets; INDUSTRY = median debt ratio of industry; VOLATILITY = 
RoAit/σRoAt. 
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Table 2b: Descriptive Statistics: Mean values by year - politically patronised firms 
 
Year Obs Lev. Size Profit Growth Tang. Industry Vol. 
1988 9 0.2884 1153.6 0.0366 1.4595 0.5069 0.1874 0.5153 
1989 10 0.2772 1772.8 0.0689 1.9312 0.5033 0.1663 0.9359 
1990 10 0.2530 1905.0 0.0829 2.7070 0.4452 0.1473 0.8738 
1991 19 0.1904 2006.2 0.0876 2.0421 0.4100 0.1492 1.0099 
1992 21 0.1786 1993.2 0.0946 1.7516 0.4264 0.1316 1.2874 
1993 23 0.1958 2373.7 0.0895 2.5405 0.3611 0.1370 1.1386 
1994 24 0.2106 2889.1 0.0907 3.3252 0.3781 0.1840 1.1392 
1995 31 0.1906 2946.5 0.0935 2.7981 0.4085 0.1939 1.3774 
1996 33 0.2315 3176.4 0.0913 2.8334 0.4030 0.2132 1.1203 
1997 32 0.2449 4187.0 0.0804 2.7231 0.4137 0.2419 0.8607 
1998 32 0.3065 4327.3 0.0372 1.2566 0.4371 0.2708 0.1829 
1999 31 0.3053 3928.0 0.0312 1.7222 0.4353 0.2397 0.2871 
2000 42 0.2903 3096.7 0.0435 2.8633 0.4377 0.1972 0.4218 
2001 44 0.2658 2956.6 0.0562 1.0687 0.4218 0.1775 0.4760 
2002 42 0.2474 2893.7 0.0558 1.4207 0.4065 0.2059 0.5234 
2003 48 0.2384 2675.6 0.0695 1.2174 0.3766 0.1915 0.6477 
2004 48 0.2521 2734.0 0.0608 1.3879 0.3918 0.1919 0.4161 
2005 51 0.2680 2746.1 0.0638 1.6504 0.4045 0.1854 0.6081 
2006 53 0.2531 2720.9 0.0594 1.3623 0.3821 0.2043 0.4872 
2007 54 0.2250 3189.7 0.0815 1.8131 0.3206 0.1881 0.6184 
2008 55 0.2458 3175.0 0.0679 1.7268 0.3324 0.1876 0.4340 
2009 53 0.2142 3825.4 0.0836 1.4879 0.3438 0.1878 0.4861 
 
Notes:   LEVERAGE = debt-to-total assets; SIZE = total assets, bn (2000 prices); TANGIBILITY = fixed 
assets-to-total assets; GROWTH = market-to-book value of equity; PROFITABILITY = earnings 
before interest and taxes-to-total assets; INDUSTRY = median debt ratio of industry; VOLATILITY = 
RoAit/σRoAt. 
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Table 2c: Descriptive Statistics: Mean values by year - non-connected firms 
Year Obs Lev. Size Profit Growth Tang. Industry  Vol. 
1988 22 0.0940 1014.4 0.0931 3.3747 0.4237 0.1207 1.3115 
1989 23 0.0908 1158.3 0.1122 2.3725 0.4093 0.1238 1.5240 
1990 30 0.1042 1117.2 0.1163 3.0556 0.3911 0.1347 1.2254 
1991 57 0.1324 792.9 0.1145 3.2753 0.3978 0.1384 1.3199 
1992 75 0.1397 730.9 0.1086 2.3982 0.4125 0.1118 1.4784 
1993 78 0.1482 727.8 0.1016 3.5811 0.4303 0.1220 1.2920 
1994 85 0.1753 833.8 0.1035 3.2717 0.4225 0.1639 1.3001 
1995 124 0.2095 816.1 0.0976 3.5302 0.3965 0.2110 1.4376 
1996 148 0.2236 1009.5 0.0945 4.7451 0.4082 0.2109 1.1593 
1997 146 0.2592 1208.3 0.0738 4.1505 0.4238 0.2498 0.7904 
1998 143 0.2773 1169.2 0.0231 1.4553 0.4463 0.2562 0.1136 
1999 141 0.2480 1203.8 0.0542 2.7055 0.4396 0.2271 0.4995 
2000 302 0.2170 628.2 0.0621 2.3893 0.4322 0.1909 0.6028 
2001 362 0.2033 585.9 0.0427 1.1863 0.4335 0.1740 0.3615 
2002 398 0.2106 530.8 0.0431 1.3554 0.4239 0.1892 0.4039 
2003 435 0.2118 522.0 0.0435 1.2118 0.4246 0.1934 0.4051 
2004 507 0.2136 483.4 0.0559 1.6216 0.4013 0.1985 0.3821 
2005 568 0.2081 460.9 0.0515 1.1746 0.3997 0.1865 0.4911 
2006 621 0.2080 581.5 0.0496 1.1800 0.3728 0.1951 0.4067 
2007 656 0.2068 473.7 0.0569 1.4216 0.3253 0.1920 0.4312 
2008 669 0.2106 480.2 0.0333 1.1883 0.3279 0.1928 0.2130 
2009 687 0.2047 538.5 0.0261 0.9272 0.3363 0.1848 0.1517 
 
Notes:   LEVERAGE = debt-to-total assets; SIZE = total assets, bn (2000 prices); TANGIBILITY = fixed 
assets-to-total assets; GROWTH = market-to-book value of equity; PROFITABILITY = earnings 
before interest and taxes-to-total assets; INDUSTRY = median debt ratio of industry; VOLATILITY = 
RoAit/σRoAt. 
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Table 3: Dynamic capital structure of Malaysian firms  
 All firms All firms All firms Restricted Restricted 
 1988-2009 1988-1997 2000-2009 1988-2009 2000-2009 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
      
Leveraget-1 0.7162*** 0.6889*** 0.7173*** 0.6894*** 0.6739*** 
 (120.01) (18.08) (91.78) (103.88) (49.63) 
Size 0.0491*** 0.0342*** 0.0683*** 0.0362*** 0.0487*** 
 (20.83) (3.18) (14.35) (14.16) (7.93) 
Profitability -0.2872*** -0.4626 -0.2527*** -0.1548*** -0.2780*** 
 (-10.20) (-1.47) (-4.37) (-5.67) (-6.63) 
Growth 0.0087*** 0.0116*** 0.0080*** 0.0076*** 0.0064*** 
 (19.46) (6.11) (8.14) (16.50) (4.83) 
Tangibility 0.1037*** 0.0715 0.0765*** 0.0997*** 0.0742*** 
 (19.58) (1.31) (10.60) (14.86) (6.75) 
Industry 0.2796*** 0.4725*** 0.1641*** -0.0059** 0.0055 
 (15.69) (5.76) (7.23) (-2.11) (1.27) 
Volatility 0.0059* 0.0096 -0.0008 0.4518*** 0.3391*** 
 (1.70) (0.36) (-0.13) (31.87) (8.55) 
Constant -0.3017*** -0.1832 -0.6200*** -0.6062*** -0.7616*** 
 (-10.86) (-1.18) (-3.08) (-13.69) (-3.92) 
      
Specification tests     
Sargan 232.32 21.49 170.14 151.26 117.49 
 (0.3036) (0.9734) (0.2409) (0.6569) (0.4440) 
Autocorrelation -0.5317 -0.1727 -0.6766 0.3567 0.4704 
 (0.5949) (8629) (0.4986) (0.7213) (0.6381) 
      
Observations 6,205 812 5,048 2,344 1,532 
Number of firms 740 182 740 182 182 
 
Notes: Leverage = φ0 + γ0Leveraget-1 + γ1Volatility + γ2Profitability + γ3Growth + γ4Tangibility + γ5Industry + 
γ6Volatility + ηi  + ηt + µit. 
Where: ηi is a firm-specific effect and ηt captures common period-specific effects. µit is the error term 
representing measurement errors in the independent variable and other explanatory variables that have 
been omitted.  It is assumed to be independently identical normally distributed with zero mean and 
constant variance, i.e., µit ≈ i.i.d. N (0, σ
2
).  LEVERAGE = debt-to-total assets; SIZE = natural 
logarithm of total assets; TANGIBILITY = fixed assets-to-total assets; GROWTH = market-to-book 
value of equity; PROFITABILITY = earnings before interest and taxes-to-total assets; INDUSTRY = 
median debt ratio of industry; VOLATILITY = RoAit/σRoAt. 
 
Z-statistics in parentheses except p-values for specification tests. Year and industry effects not reported. 
 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 4: Effect of crisis, recovery and political patronage on corporate leverage 
 
Variables Coeff. Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
       
       
Di  β1 0.0315** 0.0315 0.0465  0.0388 
  (2.20) (1.05) (1.49)  (1.21) 
E1t  β2 -0.1625*** -0.1625**  -0.3267***  
  (-3.74) (-2.41)  (-5.01)  
Di * E1t β3 -0.3519*** -0.3519* -0.4410*** 0.0233 -0.5179*** 
  (-2.97) (-1.81) (-2.66) (0.16) (-3.30) 
Size*E1t βj1 0.0222*** 0.0222*** 0.0226*** 0.0477*** 0.0249*** 
  (4.12) (2.67) (2.63) (5.47) (2.79) 
Prof.*E1t βj2 -0.7660* -0.7660** -0.6344 -0.5340** -0.6586 
  (-1.82) (-2.01) (-1.39) (-2.06) (-1.34) 
Grow.*E1t βj3 0.0137*** 0.0137*** 0.0127*** 0.0140*** 0.0132*** 
  (3.46) (4.19) (3.62) (4.17) (3.67) 
Tang.*E1t βj4 0.0977*** 0.0977* 0.0971* 0.0910** 0.1048* 
  (2.92) (1.89) (1.85) (2.20) (1.94) 
Ind.*E1t βj5 0.2138** 0.2138 0.0289 0.0669  
  (2.07) (1.40) (0.18) (0.56)  
Vol.*E1t βj6 0.0082 0.0082 -0.0075 0.0126 -0.0043 
  (0.19) (0.22) (-0.16) (0.53) (-0.09) 
Size*E1t*Di βk1 0.0198 0.0198 0.0242 -0.0092 0.0291 
  (1.49) (0.91) (1.17) (-0.57) (1.40) 
Prof.*E1t* Di βk2 1.1123 1.1123 1.1608* 0.8636** 1.3072* 
  (1.29) (1.59) (1.65) (2.21) (1.77) 
Grow.*E1t* Di βk3 0.0124 0.0124 0.0141 -0.0022 0.0159 
  (1.31) (1.04) (1.24) (-0.31) (1.35) 
Tang.*E1t* Di βk4 0.0976 0.0976 0.1239 0.0349 0.1572 
  (1.16) (0.73) (0.96) (0.34) (1.17) 
Ind.*E1t* Di βk5 0.5653** 0.5653 0.7065** 0.1318 0.8396** 
  (2.22) (1.62) (2.16) (0.54) (2.50) 
Vol.*E1t* Di βk6 -0.1225 -0.1225** -0.1245** -0.0801** -0.1347** 
  (-1.29) (-1.97) (-1.98) (-2.14) (-2.05) 
E2t β22 -0.2420*** -0.2420***  -0.3108***  
  (-17.63) (-8.00)  (-5.61)  
Di * E2t β33 0.0233 0.0233 -0.0072 0.1632 -0.0162 
  (0.36) (0.20) (-0.06) (1.12) (-0.13) 
Size*E2t βl1 0.0265*** 0.0265*** 0.0283*** 0.0451*** 0.0281*** 
  (12.45) (5.53) (5.86) (5.90) (5.66) 
Profit.*E2t βl2 -0.5987*** -0.5987*** -0.6691*** -0.6007*** -0.7186*** 
  (-3.39) (-2.88) (-2.66) (-3.52) (-2.79) 
Grow.*E2t βl3 0.0080*** 0.0080** 0.0090** 0.0118*** 0.0088** 
  (3.82) (2.23) (2.48) (2.80) (2.37) 
Tang.*E2t βl4 0.1265*** 0.1265*** 0.1380*** 0.0429 0.1366*** 
  (9.53) (4.54) (4.68) (1.47) (4.54) 
Ind.*E2t βl5 0.4789*** 0.4789*** 0.3354*** 0.1050  
  (9.77) (5.10) (2.98) (1.12)  
Vol.*E2t βl6 0.0218 0.0218 0.0304 0.0452** 0.0355 
  (0.99) (0.84) (0.96) (2.07) (1.10) 
Size*E2t*Di βm1 0.0021 0.0021 0.0060 -0.0162 0.0071 
  (0.33) (0.16) (0.45) (-0.84) (0.51) 
Prof.*E2t* Di βm2 0.0137 0.0137 -0.1683 -0.0697 -0.2553 
  (0.02) (0.02) (-0.28) (-0.15) (-0.45) 
Grow.*E2t* Di βm3 0.0117 0.0117 0.0116 0.0022 0.0116 
  (1.53) (1.09) (1.09) (0.17) (1.10) 
Tang.*E2t* Di βm4 -0.0273 -0.0273 -0.0418 0.0631 -0.0403 
  (-0.51) (-0.25) (-0.41) (0.73) (-0.39) 
Ind.*E2t* Di βm5 -0.4313** -0.4313 -0.4113 -0.4348* -0.3567 
45 
 
 
 
  (-2.20) (-1.20) (-1.12) (-1.79) (-0.92) 
Vol.*E2t* Di βm6 -0.0075 -0.0075 0.0079 0.0093 0.0165 
  (-0.09) (-0.11) (0.12) (0.16) (0.26) 
Constant  0.1883*** 0.1883*** 0.1382*** 0.2355*** 0.0496** 
  (27.91) (14.47) (4.52) (17.36) (2.03) 
       
Observations  6,201 6,201 6,201 6,201 6,201 
R-squared  0.1376 0.1376 0.1537 0.7303 0.1629 
 
Notes: Yit = 1Di + 2E1t + 3Di*E1t +∑ 𝛽𝑗
𝑞
𝑗=𝑞  Xit-1*E1t +∑ 𝛽𝑘
𝑞
𝑘=𝑞 Xit-1*E1t*Di +22E2t + 33Di*E2t +∑ 𝛽𝑙
𝑞
𝑙=𝑞  Xit-
1*E2t +∑ 𝛽𝑚
𝑞
𝑚=𝑞 Xit-1*E2t*Di + it 
Standard errors are robust in Model 1 and clustered at firm level in all other models. Model 3 includes 
(unreported) time dummies and industry dummies. Model 4 specifies industry-year effects. Model 5 specifies 
firm-industry effects. 
 
Robust t-statistics in parentheses. 
 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Figure 1: Leverage 1988-2009
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Figure 2: Parallel Trends Assumption
